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Abstract 
Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The 
possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis 
for risk assessment and management. The paper demonstrates the general point for cost and demand 
risks in urban rail projects. The paper presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk 
assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of 
projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach 
developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve 
economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.  
 
 
Keywords: Urban rail, cost underestimation, cost overrun, cost escalation, demand overestimation, 
demand shortfalls, economic risk assessment and management, transportation infrastructure finance. 
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The Age of Megaprojects 
We live in the age of megaprojects. Never have so many expensive, large-scale projects been built 
over so short a historical period (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and 
Rothengatter, 2003). Projects have grown larger over time, and increased size implies higher economic 
risks. A recent survey of top management in 25 of the largest construction firms in the world showed 
that executives see managing and pricing risk as one of their key challenges, and 63 percent of 
respondents said it was their biggest issue. Executives cited poor forecasting, poor risk identification, 
and cost escalation as the three top reasons for reduced profit margins (KPMG 2005). The basic 
problem is that reliable knowledge of risks is wanting or non-existent for most types of projects 
(Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005; Morris and Hough, 1987; Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995; 
World Bank, 1994). In the case of transportation infrastructure projects--rail, bridges, tunnels, roads, 
airports, seaports, terminals--studies of cost risks even point in opposite directions, with some authors 
(Pickrell, 1990) claiming that projects are highly risky, whereas others (Nijkamp and Ubbels, 1999) 
say this is not the case. A survey of the data and samples behind the studies explains why such diverse 
conclusions may exist side by side and why knowledge of risk is deficient: Previous studies are small-
N research. Samples therefore cover too few projects to allow systematic, statistical analysis, and 
results of the studies are likely to depend on random properties of the selected samples (Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005; Fouracre, Allport, and Thomson, 1990; Hall, 1980; Kain, 1990; 
Richmond, 1998; Walmsley and Pickett, 1992). 
 This conclusion holds, too, for the subject of the present paper, which is urban rail, a 
particularly costly type of public works project. Only few studies exist of the economic risks of urban 
rail projects and they are all small-N. The two best executed and most prominent studies in the field 
cover ten and 13 projects, respectively (Pickrell, 1990; Fouracre, Allport, and Thomson, 1990).i In 
comparison, the sample of urban rail projects established for the present study consists of 44 urban rail 
projects, which are compared with 214 other transportation infrastructure projects. The sample is the 
largest of its kind, and it allows, for the first time, statistically significant conclusions regarding the 
economic risks involved in building urban rail projects. The sample also allows statistically significant 
comparisons with other types of projects and between different geographical regions.  
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 Absent or inadequate risk assessment and management are, in themselves, an important source 
of risk for projects. Because, until now, no reliable measure has been available for estimating risk in 
urban rail projects, effective risk assessment and management have been impossible. The study 
described below is aimed at changing this situation. It denotes a first step toward empirically grounded 
and valid risk assessment and management of urban rail projects by presenting and analyzing data that 
allow such risk assessment and management. 
 In addition to lack of a sound empirical basis, a main cause of absent risk assessment and 
management is lack of institutional checks and balances that would enforce accountability with rail 
project promoters towards risk. Such accountability would generate a demand for knowledge about 
real risks that is often absent today. The study described below documents a dire need for checks, 
balances, and accountability of this type. The work with developing procedures and institutional 
designs that, if implemented, would strengthen accountability towards risk has been begun elsewhere 
and will not be taken up here (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, and Rothengatter, 1998; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and 
Rothengatter, 2003; Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005). Finally, it 
should be stressed that absent risk assessment is not caused by lack of relevant methods. The methods 
exist and are fairly well developed, technically speaking. The problem is one of application. First, if 
methods of risk assessment are applied at all, applications are typically based on hypothetical, 
subjective data. This is due to the lack of empirical knowledge about risk mentioned above. Second, 
applications often have little or no bearing on real decision making, because of their lack of 
institutional grounding. 
 The following interesting questions are not addressed in the present paper, because they have 
been covered elsewhere: Why urban rail projects differ from other projects, the causes of cost 
underestimation and demand overestimation, possible differences between public and private projects, 
and how risk assessment and management may be designed in practice. The reader is referred to 
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2004, 2005), Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003), and 
Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) for answers to these questions and for further references. Previous papers 
have covered costs and demand separately (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005). This paper brings 
the two together for the first time and focuses the analysis on urban rail and risk. 
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Methods 
"Urban rail" is here defined as rail in an urban area, including both heavy and light rail, which may be 
underground, at level, or elevated. "Risk" in urban rail projects is defined as downside uncertainty 
regarding costs and ridership. Urban rail projects are compared to other types of transportation 
infrastructure projects in order to test for differences. For a more detailed description of the methods 
involved than that given below, see Flyvbjerg (2005) and Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2005). 
 Cost data for all projects consist of information about the difference between forecasted and 
actual construction costs for a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects. The project 
portfolio is worth approximately US$110 billion (2005 prices). In addition to urban rail, the portfolio 
includes bridges, tunnels, roads, high-speed rail, and conventional rail. The construction costs of 
projects range from US$1.5 million to 8.5 billion, with the smallest projects typically being stretches 
of roads in larger road schemes and the largest projects being rail links, tunnels, and bridges. The 
projects are located in 20 countries on five continents, including both developed and developing 
nations. 61 projects are North American, 181 European, and 16 are placed in other countries 
(developing nations and Japan). The projects were completed between 1927 and 1998. Older projects 
were included in the sample in order to test whether the accuracy of estimated costs improve over 
time. 
 Cost data for urban rail consist of information about the difference between forecasted and 
actual construction costs for a sample of 44 urban rail projects worth approximately US$37 billion 
(2005 prices). The 44 urban rail projects is a subset of the 258 projects mentioned above. Some of the 
rail projects are extensions of already existing systems. Of the 44 urban rail projects, 18 are located in 
North America, 13 in Europe, and 13 in developing nations. The projects were completed between 
1966 and 1997. 
 For all projects the difference between forecasted and actual construction costs is calculated as 
actual costs minus forecasted costs in percent of forecasted costs. Forecasted costs are defined as 
estimated costs at the time of decision to build. This baseline is the international standard for 
calculating cost development. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted costs determined at the time 
of completing a project. All calculations are in constant prices. Thus a positive figure of, say, 25 
  
 
6/37 
 
indicates a cost escalation of 25 percent in constant prices. A negative figure similarly indicates a cost 
saving of that amount. Zero indicates that forecasted costs were correct and thus equal to actual costs.  
 Traffic data for all projects consist of information about the difference between forecasted and 
actual traffic for a sample of 210 transportation infrastructure projects. The projects again include, in 
addition to urban rail, bridges, tunnels, roads, high-speed rail, and conventional rail. The projects are 
located in 15 countries on five continents, covering both developed and developing nations. The 
projects were completed between 1969 and 1998. 
 Traffic data for urban rail consist of information about the difference between forecasted and 
actual traffic for 24 urban rail projects for which such data were available. Traffic is measured as 
number of passengers using the rail project in question, measured either as number of passengers per 
year or average daily ridership. The 24 urban rail projects is a subset of the 210 projects mentioned 
above. Of the 24 urban rail projects eight are in North America, six in Europe, and ten in developing 
nations. 
 For all projects the difference between forecasted and actual traffic is calculated as actual 
traffic minus forecasted traffic in percent of forecasted traffic. A completely accurate traffic forecast 
registers as zero. A positive figure of, say, 15 indicates actual traffic for a project was 15 percent 
higher than forecasted traffic, whereas a negative figure indicates actual traffic was that much lower 
than forecasted. Traffic is forecasted and counted for the opening year or the first full year of 
operations. The basis for calculating the difference between forecasted and actual traffic is the forecast 
at the time of decision to build the project. Again this baseline for calculations is the international 
standard. 
 The samples include all projects of the types mentioned for which reliable data were available. 
As far as the author knows, the samples are the largest of their kind and they allow for the first time 
statistically significant conclusions regarding the cost and revenue risks involved in the building of 
transportation infrastructure. If the samples are biased the bias is most likely conservative. Thus for 
costs, the sample is probably underestimating actual cost escalation in the project population. For 
traffic, the accuracy of forecasts estimated on the basis of the sample is probably higher than forecasts 
in the project population. 
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 For all data, 25, 50, and 75 percent fractiles--also called quartiles--have been calculated. The 
lower quartile indicates 25 percent of data have a lower value than that indicated and 75 percent a 
higher, whereas for the upper quartile 75 percent of data have a lower value and 25 percent a higher. 
For instance, for rail in Table 1, 25 percent of projects have cost escalations of 24 percent or lower, 50 
percent of projects have escalations of 43 percent or lower, and, finally, 75 percent of projects have 
escalations of 60 percent or lower.  In addition, averages and standard deviations have been calculated. 
In comparing groups of data, one-sided variance analysis has been used with F-test, except for two 
groups where Welch's t-test was used. Theoretically, the statistical tests are based on normal 
distributions of data but the tests are quite robust against deviations from this. In one critical case the 
tests were supplemented with a non-parametric test. 
 
 
Cost Escalation in Transportation Infrastructure Projects 
Table 1 shows the difference between forecasted and actual costs in 258 transportation infrastructure 
projects.  
 
[Table 1 app. here] 
 
 Statistical analysis of the figures in the table show that means and standard deviations are 
significantly different for different project types. Projects, therefore, should not be pooled; each 
project type should be considered separately. The table shows: 
  
• Rail has the largest cost escalation with an average of 44.7 percent, followed by bridges and 
tunnels with 33.8 percent, and finally roads with 20.4 percent. 
 
• For rail, 75 percent of all projects have cost escalations of at least 24 percent. 25 percent of 
projects have cost escalations of at least 60 percent. 
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• The hypothesis that type of project has no effect on cost escalation is rejected at a very high 
level of statistical significance (p<0.001). 
 
• The hypothesis that the error of underestimating costs is as common as the error of 
overestimating costs, or is numerically of the same size, is rejected with very high 
significance (p<0.001). 
 
• For a randomly selected project the frequency of cost escalation is 86 percent whereas the 
frequency of correct forecasts or cost savings is 14 percent. 
 
The size and frequency of cost escalation shown here, and the large standard deviations for forecasts 
of costs, documents a high level of uncertainty and risk as regards construction costs for transportation 
infrastructure projects in general, and particularly for rail, bridges, and tunnels. 
 
 
Cost Escalation for Urban Rail 
Table 2 compares urban rail projects in three geographical areas: Europe, North America, and other 
countries. A test of differences between the three areas gives p=0.227. Thus there is no indication of 
difference; numerical variations can be considered random and projects in the three areas may be 
analyzed together. 
 
[Table 2 app. here] 
 
 Table 3 compares urban rail to other rail (high-speed rail and ordinary rail) for which data 
were available regarding cost escalation. There is no significant difference between high-speed rail 
and ordinary rail (p=0.326). The two are therefore pooled and treated as one group under the heading 
"other rail." A test of difference between urban rail and other rail gives p=0.953. Thus there is no 
indication of difference but quite the opposite: The similarities are very high.  
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[Table 3 app. here] 
 
 Because there is no significant difference between urban and other rail the key question 
becomes how cost escalation for rail compares with cost escalation for other projects. And this 
question has already been addressed (see Table 1 and accompanying text). 
 For urban rail as well as other rail the conclusion is that these projects have cost escalations 
that are particularly large. For urban rail 75 percent of projects have cost escalations of at least 33 
percent. 25 percent of urban rail projects have cost escalations of at least 60 percent. 
 For urban rail and other rail, large cost escalations combined with large standard deviations 
result in a particularly high level of uncertainty and risk regarding forecasts of costs, that is, budgets. 
The economic risk for such projects, here the risk that a given project turn out substantially more 
expensive than said at the time of making the decision to build the project, is significant. Assessment 
and management of such risk should therefore be central to all phases of the project development cycle 
in urban and other rail projects, from decision making to planning to construction. 
 
 
Demand Shortfalls in Transportation Infrastructure Projects 
Traffic data consist of ridership for rail projects, including rail on bridges and in tunnels, and number 
of vehicles for road projects, including roads on bridges and in tunnels. Table 4 shows percentage 
differences between forecasted and actual traffic in the 210 transportation infrastructure projects in the 
sample. 
 
[Table 4 app. here] 
 
 Statistical analysis of the figures in Table 4 shows the averages are significantly different 
across project types. Thus project types should be handled separately. The figures in the table show: 
 
• For rail, actual traffic is on average 39.5 percent lower than forecasted traffic. For road, 
actual traffic is on average 9.5 percent higher than forecasted. 
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• For rail, 75 percent of projects have actual traffic that is at least 25 percent lower than 
forecasted traffic. 25 percent of projects have actual traffic that is at least 70 percent lower 
than forecasted. 
 
• The upper and lower decil for rail (not shown in Table 4) show that only ten percent of 
projects achieve the traffic forecasted or more, whereas the lower ten percent of projects 
achieve 20 percent or less of forecasted traffic. For roads the figures are substantially more 
balanced. 
 
• A statistical test of whether rail and road are different gives p<0.001. The difference is highly 
significant. 
 
In sum, forecasted traffic is rarely achieved for rail while this is much more common for roads, even 
though a large standard deviation for roads indicates that for these projects, too, uncertainty and risk 
are high for traffic forecasts. For rail, large and frequent overestimations of ridership combined with a 
high standard deviation documents that uncertainty and risk are very high for traffic forecasts for this 
type of project. 
 
 
Demand Shortfalls for Urban Rail 
Table 5 compares urban rail projects in three geographical areas: Europe, North America, and other 
countries. 
 
[Table 5 app. here] 
 
 A test of difference between geographical areas gives p=0.004. Thus the difference is highly 
significant. The forecasts are more balanced for Europe than for the two other geographical areas even 
if the standard deviation is very high. However, two German urban rail projects have strongly 
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diverging figures, namely 158 and 60 percent more passengers than forecast. If these two projects are 
treated as statistical outliers, as the distribution of data indicate should be the case, then the figures in 
Table 6 result. 
 A test of difference between geographical areas now gives p=0.054. The difference is no 
longer significant, even if the p-value is only just above the conventional critical value of 0.05. With a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, which is non-parametric and thus disregards normal distribution, p=0.074, that is, 
also non-significant. On this basis, no division between geographical areas is necessary in the 
statistical analysis. This conclusion is subject to the usual reservations for statistical analysis based on 
small numbers, especially for Europe. With only four observations and a p-value that is almost 
significant there is a marked need for information about more projects to ensure more valid 
conclusions as regards geographical subgroups of urban rail projects. 
 
[Table 6 app. here] 
 
 For all urban rail projects, excluding the two German outliers, the following applies: 
 
• Actual ridership is on average 50.8 percent lower than forecast. 
 
• Only two projects out of 22 achieved the forecasted ridership. 
 
• 75 percent of projects achieved a ridership that was at least 40 percent lower than forecast. 
 
• 25 percent of projects achieved a ridership that was at least 68 percent lower than forecast. 
 
In sum, for urban rail projects forecasted ridership is routinely far from achieved. Low actual ridership 
combined with a high standard deviation show that uncertainty and risk are very high for ridership 
forecasts for urban rail. 
 To the extent that ridership is the basis for revenues, which is almost always the case, then the 
high risk regarding ridership translates into an equally high economic risk. The figures show this risk 
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should be taken very seriously in urban rail projects and should occupy a central place in preparing, 
deciding, and operating such projects. 
 
 
The Double Risk of Urban Rail 
The analysis of construction costs show that urban rail projects on average turn out substantially more 
costly than forecast. At the same time the analysis of ridership show urban rail to achieve considerably 
fewer passengers than forecasted and thus lower revenues. Urban rail is therefore economically risky 
on two fronts, both as regards costs and as regards revenues. Urban rail is doubly risky and the 
possibilities for financing cost escalations incurred during construction through increased revenues 
from more passengers during operations will often be limited. 
 In order to analyze the double risk of urban rail in a more systematic fashion, all urban rail 
projects were identified for which data were available both for the difference between forecasted and 
actual costs and for the difference between forecasted and actual ridership. This is 14 projects, of 
which eight are located in North America and six in Europe. 
 Table 7 shows the data for the 14 projects. The double risk with both cost escalation and 
lower-than-forecasted ridership is exceedingly clear for these projects. However, the two German 
projects mentioned above, which should be considered statistical outliers, are included in the 14 
projects in Table 7. 
 
[Table 7 app. here] 
 
 Table 8 shows the data if the two German projects are excluded as statistical outliers, as they 
should be. The double risk is now even more pronounced with an average cost escalation of 40.3 
percent combined with an actual ridership that is on average 47.8 percent lower than forecasted.  
 
[Table 8 app. here] 
 
  
 
13/37 
 
 With only 12 observations reservations must be made for small numbers. Yet, the numbers are 
so significant and are supported so distinctly by the larger number of observations in other parts of the 
analysis that the conclusion stands firm that urban rail projects are high-risk ventures because revenue 
risks amplify cost risks and create projects that are risky to the second degree. 
  
 
Benchmarking Urban Rail: the Case of the Copenhagen Metro 
With a point of departure in the analysis above, it is possible to benchmark economic risk in specific 
urban rail projects in an empirically and statistically valid manner. Other rail projects, bridges, tunnels, 
roads, airports, seaports, and terminals can be benchmarked similarly. As an example of benchmarking 
in urban rail, this section focuses on the Copenhagen Metro in Denmark, which is currently under 
construction. The first two stages opened in 2002 and 2003, respectively, and a third stage is planned 
to open in 2007. The combined length of the first three stages is 21 kilometers with 22 stations; ten 
kilometers are in tunnel, three kilometers elevated, and eight kilometers at-grade. A 14-kilometer 
fourth stage is in the decision making phase.  
 In Denmark, Parliament typically approves large transport infrastructure investments by 
passing a law, which in addition to the approval contains specific terms of the investment in question. 
So too for the Copenhagen Metro. When in 1992 the Danish Parliament decided to authorize the first 
three stages of the metro, legislators specified main alignment of track, location of major stations, and 
indicated which parts would be built in tunnel, elevated, and at-grade, respectively. The Parliament 
also decided that the public companies, which would be responsible for each of the three stages, would 
be allowed to build "different types of light rail, including urban rail [tram], mini-metro, and magnetic 
rail" (Danish Parliament, 1992, §7). As a basis for the Parliament's decision, the Minister of Finance 
presented MPs with a cost estimate of DKK 3.11 billion covering "the transport infrastructure 
mentioned in the proposed law," of which DKK 2.91 billion was for the first three stages of the metro 
and DKK 0.2 billion for a road and bike routes (Danish Parliament, 1991a, 7; 1990 prices).ii The 
estimated number of passengers per year was 35 million for a tram and 43 million for a mini-metro; 
the latter would run more frequently than a tram and have shorter travel times (Danish Parliament, 
1991b, question no. 19). The project would be financed by two sources of revenue: passenger incomes 
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and incomes from the selling of public land, which would be serviced by the new rail system. 
Financing was backed by sovereign guarantees, i.e., if the project proved non-viable the taxpayer 
would pick up the bill. 
 In 1993, Ørestadsselskabet--the public company in charge of project development--was 
established. The company analyzed different types of urban rail and in 1994 estimated that a tram 
would cost DKK 3.9 billion and generate 47 million passengers per year, whereas a more advanced 
light rail system would cost DKK 4.9 billion and generate 77 million passengers per year, while, 
finally, an automated mini-metro would cost DKK 5.2 billion and generate 88 million passengers per 
year (National Audit Office of Denmark, 2000, 42, 1994 prices). On that basis, in October 1994, 
Ørestadsselskabet decided to build an automated mini-metro. The higher cost of the mini-metro would 
be justified by higher revenues from more passengers, or so Ørestadsselskabet reasoned. After 
tendering, construction started in 1996 and soon after the project incurred significant delay and further 
cost increases. In 2005, with the project 95 percent completed, costs had increased 157 percent in 
constant prices compared with the budget presented to Parliament in 1991-92; compared with the 
budget estimated by Ørestadsselskabet in 1994 the cost increase is 66% (Ørestadsselskabet, 2005, 29). 
Final costs will not be know until construction is completed in 2007 and contractor claims settled, 
which is expected to happen in 2008-09. 
 In 2002, when the first stage of the Copenhagen Metro opened to passengers, a main concern 
was whether ridership would live up to expectations. As a consequence of the cost escalations 
described above, high passenger revenues were crucial to project viability. In 2003, the first full year 
of operations, 20 million passengers rode the metro, which was 35% below the 31 million passengers 
forecast by Ørestadsselskabet (2004, 16) for that year. In 2004 ridership was 34 million, or 46% below 
the forecast, and in 2005 it was 36 million, or 41% below the forecast (Ørestadsselskabet, 2005, 10, 
12; Ørestadsselskabet, 2006; National Audit Office of Denmark, 2004, 26). As a result of the lower-
than-expected ridership, Ørestadsselskabet reduced its forecasts. For 2005, the forecast was 61 million 
passengers, which was lowered to 44 million and was not achieved. For 2008, the forecast was 73 
million, lowered to 63 million. Finally, for 2010, 80 million passengers was lowered to 74 million 
(National Audit Office of Denmark, 2004, 26). The forecast on the basis of which Parliament 
approved the metro in 1992 cannot be directly compared with actual ridership, because the forecast 
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assumes that all three stages of the metro would be operating by 2000 and none were operating this 
year, and in 2005 only two stages were in operation. But depending on the assumptions made one 
finds that ridership for the first full year of operations was approximately 40 percent lower than 
forecasted ridership. It may be argued, however, that since the higher passenger forecast made by 
Ørestadsselskabet in 1994 was used to justify the more expensive investment in an automated mini-
metro, as mentioned above, this is the forecast that should be used as the basis for comparison. For 
2004, the first year in which both stage 1 and stage 2 were in full operation, such a comparison can be 
made and it shows that actual ridership was 44 percent lower than that forecasted, which is equivalent 
to the forecast being overestimated by 79 percent (National Audit Office of Denmark, 2004, 26). In 
conclusion, the high ridership forecasts, which were used to justify investment in an expensive 
automated mini-metro, have not as yet materialized as real, paying passengers. In fact, actual ridership 
for the mini-metro is below that forecast by Ørestadsselskabet for two less expensive tram and light 
rail schemes, which were rejected by Ørestadsselskabet because these schemes would carry too few 
passengers (National Audit Office of Denmark, 2000, 42). 
 The cost escalations and demand shortfalls described above for the Copenhagen Metro have 
generated substantial interest and controversy among Danish lawmakers, citizens, media, and 
professionals. Furthermore, the ballooning budget and lower-than-forecasted ridership has resulted in 
two audits by the Auditor General of Denmark (2000, 2004). The Copenhagen Metro is the first metro 
in Denmark and people, including the auditors, have asked, for instance, whether cost escalations and 
demand shortfalls are common for this type of project? Whether escalations and shortfalls of the size 
encountered in Copenhagen are common? Whether the project is worse or better on these points than 
urban rail in other countries? 
 Such questions can now be answered in a statistically valid manner because a standard of 
comparison has been established with the data presented in the previous sections. For instance, the 
answer to the question of whether cost escalation is common for urban rail is unambiguously positive: 
86 percent of the urban rail projects covered in the study above had cost escalations. However, a cost 
escalation of 157 percent, like that found for the first three stages of the Copenhagen Metro, is 
unusually high. Compared to the average cost escalation for all urban rail projects of 45 percent, which 
may be used as an "average practice" benchmark, the cost escalation in Copenhagen is more than three 
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times higher (see Table 9). Even if we consider cost escalation only after the decision to build the 
automated mini-metro in 1994, and thus give the Copenhagen Metro a large advantage over the 
benchmark, the Copenhagen Metro still performs 21 percentage points poorer than the benchmark in 
terms of cost escalation. Among the 44 urban rail projects covered by the cost study above, only in 
developing nations do we find a project with cost escalation higher than that found in Copenhagen; all 
other projects have lower escalations. 
 
[Table 9 app. here] 
 
 The answer to the question of whether demand shortfalls are common for urban rail projects 
must also be answered in the affirmative. 91 percent of the urban rail projects covered by the study 
above had demand shortfalls. The demand shortfall for the Copenhagen Metro is 6-11 percentage 
points lower than demand shortfall in the benchmark (see Table 9). Thus the Copenhagen Metro has 
performed better than the benchmark on this variable. However, when we combine the cost escalation 
of 157 percent with the demand shortfall of 40-45 percent, we begin to understand why the 
Copenhagen Metro is a project in deep financial trouble, and why it has attracted as much negative 
public attention as is the case. 
 It is telling of just how widespread and negative publicity has been that when a popular Danish 
money magazine recently asked its readers to choose the most wasteful person in Denmark among ten 
nominated for their misuse of citizens' money, the readers unambiguously chose the chairman of 
Ørestadsselskabet.  The chairman was nominated for "having no control whatsoever over costs for the 
Metro, as regards both operating and construction costs, not to speak of ridership" (Penge og 
Privatøkonomi, no. 11, 2004; no. 1, 2005).  
 Such public concern over taxpayers' money is well founded, as may be demonstrated by 
considering development in the payback period for the Copenhagen Metro. When the metro was 
proposed to Parliament in 1991-92, the payback period was estimated at 14 years (Danish Parliament, 
1991b, question 20). In 2005, the payback period had increased to 55 years (Ørestadsselskabet, 2005, 
23). With a payback period that was now longer than the life span of several assets in the project, for 
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instance rolling stock, reinvestments had to be considered, resulting in a payback period of 76 years, 
or 442 percent longer than originally estimated (Ørestadsselskabet, 2005, 24, 27).  
 Project viability has so far been based mainly on luck, in the sense that viability has been 
secured only by the lowest interest rate in recorded history and by an unprecedented real estate boom 
in Copenhagen. Sensitivity analyses carried out by Ørestadsselskabet (2005, 24) show that an increase 
in interest rate of one percentage point would make it impossible to pay back the project debt. The 
same holds for a 30 percent drop in sales prices of real estate, which partly fund the metro. In addition 
to these risks, there is the risk that passenger forecasts will continue not to live up to expectations and 
that Ørestadsselskabet may not be able to avoid paying the claims brought against it by its contractors. 
It is no wonder, then, that in 2005 the owners of Ørestadsselskabet--the Danish government and 
Copenhagen Municipality--decided to restructure the company in an attempt to arrive at a more viable 
set-up. 
 According to the Auditor General of Denmark (2000), one reason that financial risks in the 
Copenhagen Metro have so dramatically caught up with the project is lack of adequate risk assessment 
and management in the project. On this point, too, the Copenhagen Metro resembles urban rail 
projects in other parts of the world where sound risk assessment and management are also the 
exception rather than the norm. In retrospect, the single most important cause of troubles for the 
Copenhagen Metro is the decision made by Ørestadsselskabet in 1994 to build an expensive automated 
mini-metro, based on the expectation that the increased expense--compared with less expensive tram 
and light rail systems--would be more than offset by even larger increases in passenger revenues. The 
cost and revenue risks involved in this decision were severely underestimated. As a consequence, the 
already expensive mini-metro became even more expensive and the passengers that would justify the 
investment did not appear. Hopefully for Danish taxpayers, the planners and managers of the planned 
DKK 15 billion, all-tunnel fourth stage of the Copenhagen Metro will be better at managing risks--and 
at forecasting costs and ridership--than the planners and managers for the first three stages. And 
hopefully others, too, may learn from the very expensive lessons regarding risk assessment and 
management taught by the first three stages of the Copenhagen Metro. 
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Economic Risk in Other Policy Areas 
In addition to data on economic risk for transportation infrastructure projects, the author has reviewed 
such data for several hundred other projects in other policy areas, including power plants, dams, water 
projects, oil and gas extraction projects, information technology systems, aerospace projects, and 
weapons systems (Arditi, Akan, and Gurdamar, 1985; Canaday, 1980; Blake, Cox, and Fraize, 1976; 
Department of Energy Study Group, 1975; Dlakwa and Culpin, 1990; Fraser, 1990; Hall, 1980; 
Healey, 1964; Henderson, 1977; Hufschmidt and Gerin, 1970; Merrow, 1988; Morris and Hough, 
1987; World Bank, 1994; World Bank, undated). The data indicate that other types of projects and 
other policy areas incur economic risks in the same order of magnitude as the risks involved in 
transportation infrastructure projects.  
 Among the more spectacular examples are the Sydney Opera House with actual costs 
approximately 15 times higher than those projected and the Concorde supersonic airplane with 12 
times higher costs (Hall, undated, p. 3). The data also indicate that economic risks have neither 
increased nor decreased historically and that underestimation is common in both first and third-world 
countries (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005). When the Suez canal was completed in 1869 
actual construction costs were 20 times higher than the earliest estimated costs and three times higher 
than the cost estimate for the year before construction began. The Panama Canal, completed in 1914, 
had cost escalations in the range from 70 to 200 percent (Summers, 1967, p. 148). In sum, the 
phenomenon of substantial economic risk appear to be characteristic not only of urban rail and other 
transportation projects but of projects in other policy areas as well. 
 
 
Summary and Discussion 
Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The 
possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis 
for risk assessment and management. The paper demonstrates this point for cost and revenue risks in 
urban rail projects. The paper presents, for the first time, empirical evidence that allow valid economic 
risk assessment and management of such projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of 
projects. 
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 The paper shows that urban rail projects are particularly risky ventures, although other 
transportation projects, like tunnels and bridges, are also highly risky, as are projects in other policy 
areas than transportation: 
 
• Average cost escalation for urban rail is 45 percent in constant prices. 
• For 25 percent of urban rail projects cost escalations are at least 60 percent.  
• Actual ridership is on average 51 percent lower than forecasted. 
• For 25 percent of urban rail projects actual ridership is at least 68 percent lower than 
forecasted.  
 
When cost risk and revenue risk are combined, a risk profile emerges for urban rail, which proves such 
projects to be economically risky to the second degree.  
 This conclusion is not intended to serve as an argument against building urban rail; many 
cities, undoubtedly, need urban rail to solve their transportation problems. Neither is it an attack on 
public--vs. private--spending on infrastructure, because the data do not allow an answer to the 
interesting question of whether private projects perform better or worse than public ones in terms of 
economic and financial risk. Finally, the data and conclusions do not warrant an attack on spending on 
transportation vs. spending on other policy areas, because projects in other policy areas appear as 
liable to cost escalation and lower-than-forecasted revenues as are transportation projects. 
 What the data and conclusions do establish--with urban rail as an in-depth case study--is that 
significant cost underestimation and revenue overestimation are widespread practices in project 
development and implementation. Such practices are sources of substantial risk and they form real 
barriers to the effective allocation of scarce resources for building important infrastructure. The data 
document a need for implementing institutional checks and balances that would change the current 
practices of cost underestimation and revenue overestimation to ones where empirically based and 
statistically valid risk assessment and management are effectively used in all phases of the policy and 
project development process, from planning to decision making to construction to operations, in order 
to properly identify, reduce, and manage risk.  
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 With actual costs and patronage in urban rail being different from that forecasted to the degree 
and with the statistical significance documented above, an inevitable conclusion is that the results of 
conventional cost-benefit analysis, which is typically at the core of documentation and decision 
making for this type of project, is of little or negative value here. A cost-benefit analysis based on the 
forecasts of costs and revenues described above would, with a high degree of certainty, be strongly 
misleading. Garbage in, garbage out, as the saying goes. This does not show the uselessness of cost-
benefit analysis as such, needless to say. But if informed decisions are the goal, then empirical risk 
analysis must supplement conventional cost-benefit analysis as the main means for documenting and 
deciding on urban rail projects. 
 Given the data presented above, a key policy recommendation for legislators and citizens who 
care about what Williams (1998) calls "honest numbers" is they should not trust the budgets, 
patronage forecasts, and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and planners of urban 
rail. Independent studies should be carried out, and, again, such studies should be strong on 
empirically based risk assessment and management.  
 Until now it has been difficult or impossible to carry out meaningful economic risk assessment 
and management for urban rail projects, because empirically grounded and statistically valid figures of 
risk did not exist for this type of project. With the study documented above such figures now exist and 
empirical risk assessment and management can begin. In addition to sound data, institutional checks 
and balances that would enforce accountability in actors towards risk are also necessary to make risk 
assessment and management work. The labor with developing such checks and balances has been 
begun elsewhere (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, and Rothengatter, 1998; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and 
Rothengatter, 2003; Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005).  
 Two areas stand out as particularly pertinent for further research. One is further data 
collection, the other is development and test of explanatory models that would clarify the peculiar bias 
found in cost and traffic forecasts for urban rail. As regards further data collection, even though the 
sample used in the study is the largest of its kind, it is too small to allow more than the crudest 
subdivisions, and thus the simplest of comparisons and explanations. More data on more urban rail 
schemes are needed in order to see whether different types of schemes perform differently, for 
instance light rail compared with heavy rail, driverless metros compared with ordinary metros, and rail 
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above ground compared to underground rail. More geographical data are needed as well, especially for 
patronage in Europe, where the number of observations are particularly low, making comparisons 
between different parts of the world difficult. With such data risk assessment and management could 
be further improved. 
 As for explanatory models, when, as a researcher, you uncover a body of information for 
decision making that is as systematically and significantly biased as that documented above for urban 
rail--with strongly underestimated costs and strongly overestimated ridership--you obviously begin to 
ask what causes such striking bias and which purposes does it serve? These questions are particularly 
pertinent for projects as costly and consequential as urban rail projects, each of which often measures 
in the billion-dollar range. Playing the devil's advocate one might argue that urban rail investments are 
not risky at all. Calling them risky implies that there is some high uncertainty with respect to outcome. 
The evidence presented above suggests just the opposite, however. Outcomes are very certain. 
Ridership will almost certainly be lower than forecasted. Costs will almost certainly be higher than 
forecasted. There is a difference between making a risky investment and an investment that will 
almost surely underperform. The question is why the latter type of investment is repeatedly made in 
the field of urban rail, as if no learning takes place. 
 Work that attempts to answer such questions has recently been begun elsewhere by testing 
different types of explanatory models of bias and risk: technical, economic, psychological, and 
political. As part of this exercise tests are carried out of how data fit the possibility that urban rail 
forecasts are strategically and deliberately misleading, that is, that forecasted costs and revenues are 
produced, not as best estimates of what the future will bring if projects are built, but instead as 
misrepresentation constructed to get projects built (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2005; Flyvbjerg, in 
progress).  
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Table 1: Average cost escalation in 258 transportation infrastructure projects. Constant prices.  
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average cost 
escalation (%) 
Standard deviation 
Rail 58 24/43/60 44,7 38,4 
Bridges and tunnels 33 -1/22/35 33,8 62,4 
Roads 167 5/15/32 20,4 29,9 
All projects 258 5/20/35 27,6 38,7 
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Table 2: Average cost escalation in 44 urban rail projects in three geographical areas. Constant 
prices.  
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average cost 
escalation (%) 
Standard deviation 
Europe 13 39/45/57 43,3 21,3 
North America 18 33/42/54 35,8 30,4 
Other 13 35/59/75 59,2 53,6 
All  44 33/44/59 44,9 37,3 
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Table 3: Average cost escalation in 58 rail projects. Constant prices.  
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average cost 
escalation (%) 
Standard deviation 
Urban rail 44 33/44/60 44,9 37,3 
Other rail 14 10/34/75 44,1 43,3 
All  58 24/43/60 44,7 38,4 
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Table 4: Difference between forecasted and actual traffic in 210 transportation infrastructure 
projects. 
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average difference 
(%) 
Standard deviation 
Rail (ridership) 27 -70/-54/-25 -39,5 52,4 
Roads (vehicles) 183 -18/0/28 9,5 44,3 
All  210 -24/-4/24 3,2 48,2 
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Table 5: Difference between forecasted and actual ridership in 24 urban rail projects in three 
geographical areas. 
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average difference 
(%) 
Standard deviation 
Europe 6 -29/-4/45 20,7 77,3 
North America 8 -69/-63/-53 -60,0 17,0 
Other 10 -70/-57/-50 -54,3 27,5 
All  24 -67/-53/-27 -37,5 53,5 
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Table 6: Difference between forecasted and actual ridership in 22 urban rail projects in three 
geographical areas. Two statistical outliers excluded. 
Project type No. of projects  
(N) 
Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Average difference (%) Standard deviation 
Europe 4 -40/-22/-6 -23,5 23,5 
North America 8 -69/-63/-53 -60,0 17,0 
Other 10 -70/-57/-50 -54,3 27,5 
All  22 -68/-54/-40 -50,8 26,1 
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Table 7: Cost escalation and ridership for 14 urban rail projects. 
 Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Avg. difference btwn. actual and 
forecasted development (%) 
Standard deviation 
Costs 35/45/57 42,9 25,4 
Ridership -65/-50/-13 -25,4 64,6 
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Table 8: Cost escalation and ridership for 12 urban rail projects. Two statistical outliers excluded. 
 Quartiles 
(25/50/75%) 
Avg. difference btwn. actual and 
forecasted development (%) 
Standard deviation 
Costs 28/45/56 40,3 25,3 
Ridership -67/-52/-34 -47,8 25,6 
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Table 9: Benchmarking the Copenhagen Metro. The benchmark is defined as average practice 
among urban rail projects, based on samples of 44 and 22 projects for cost escalation and 
demand shortfalls respectively. 
 
 Copenhagen Metro Benchmark 
(average practice) 
Diff. btwn. Copenhagen 
Metro and benchmark 
Cost escalation % 
(constant prices) 
157 45 112 
Demand shortfall % 40-45% 51 -11 to -6 
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Notes 
                                                      
i A third study exists, which covers 17 urban rail projects (Merewitz, 1973a, b). This is, to our knowledge, the 
only earlier study of urban rail and transportation infrastructure with an attempt at statistical analysis. This study 
aimed at comparing cost overrun in urban rapid transit projects, and especially overrun in the San Francisco Bay 
Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, with overrun in four other types of public works projects. We have 
replicated this study and found that in addition to issues of small-N sampling, the handling of data raises a 
number of problems. First, cost data were not corrected for inflation, that is, current prices were used instead of 
constant prices. This is known to be a major source of error due to varying inflation rates between projects and 
varying duration of construction periods. Second, in statistical tests the mean cost overrun of subgroups of 
projects, for instance urban rail, was compared with the grand mean of overrun for all projects, thus making the 
error of comparing projects with themselves. Subgroups should have been tested directly against other subgroups 
in deciding whether they differ at all and, if so, which ones differ. Third, Merewitz (1973a) and (1973b) are 
inconsistent. Merewitz (1973a) calculates the grand mean of cost overrun as the average of means for subgroups; 
that is, the grand mean is unweighted where common practice is to use the weighted mean, as appears to be the 
approach taken in Merewitz (1973b). Fourth, due to insufficient information the p-values calculated are difficult 
to verify; most likely they are flawed, however, and the use of one-sided p-values is misleading. Finally, a 
debatable assumption about symmetry was used, which has more impact for the non-parametric test used than 
non-normality has for parametric methods. Despite these shortcomings, the approach taken in this study was 
innovative for its time and in principle pointed in the right direction regarding how to analyze risks from cost 
overrun in public works projects. 
ii These and later prices do not include VAT. 
